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The origin of this work lays on the observation, during the 1990s in Russia, of an original 
socioprofessional composition of unemployment. White-collar workers (ITRs
1
) constituted the 
greatest part of the workers registered as job seekers, while the situations wanted by companies from 
job centres concerned skilled manual workers mainly. 
 
This situation is a moot point for economics. It is noticeably distant from the transformation plans of 
the Russian industry, as they were developed by the so-called “standard” approach. This 
transformation would be directed to a rationalization of the labour factor and an increase in the 
activities which are not directly linked with production. It would thus happen to the detriment of the 
manual labour force. However, since the transition, we have observed that the position of the working 
categories in the producing process has been maintained. 
 
Hence another question : how to interpret the recurring of a phenomenon which already existed in the 
previous socialist system, while the economical environment has been deeply altered ? What kind of 
analytical tools can we mobilize to understand this phenomenon? 
 
Talking of which, we draw the hypothesis of a continuation of the practices of industrial work 
management relying on a  social construct which structuring role and time-continuum indicate to turn 
towards a perspective which takes the role of institutions into account. 
 
We suggest to interpret this social construct as the result of a set of social relations. These social 
relations can be observed at the firm level. They have led to the increase in value of the position of the 
working labour force in three fields : the system of “generation of competence”, the working process, 
and industrial relations of the socialist firm. On the other hand, the ITR categories are discredited and 
under-employed. But, to a large extent, these facts kept on happening after 1991. 
 
This social construct has a certain consistency which will be qualified as “societal”. These interacting 
social relations endowed with a capacity of reproduction, would exert a “societal effect” on the labour 
market and would account for the battle of wills favourable to blue-collar workers who were already 
present during the Soviet  era. 
 
Firstly, we will present the characteristics of unemployment in Russia and will point up the limits of 
the standard approach to explain them. (I). Then, we will demonstrate how the contradictory situation 
of workers and specialists faced with unemployment can be explained by a societal effect (II). Using 
these results, this text will aim at showing – both from a methodological and a theoretical viewpoint – 
the interest of the societal analysis which enables to learn lessons from the transition process of 
postsocialist economies (III). 
 
We will base our demonstration both on bibliographical informations and on empirical data issued 
from high priority sector company
2
 monography we carried out in Russia during the first years of the 
transition.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Represented by the ITR group (Ingenierno Tekhnicheskoïe Rabotniki) including engineers and technicians. 
2
 The Electric Measuring Device Production Amalgamation (EMDPA). 
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I – THE INABILITY OF THE STANDARD APPROACH TO EXPLAIN 
THE SOCIOPROFESSIONNAL COMPOSITION OF 
UNEMPLOYMENT IN RUSSIA 
 
1.1. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN RUSSIA 
 
Before the law of 1991 which again recognized the status of unemployed, open unemployment had 
disappeared from the soviet economy from 1929 to 1990. In this economy, enterprises suffered from 
chronic labour shortage linked to an extensive use of labour factor inputs and to ambitious plan 
targets. This generated an “ insatiable demand ”3 for labour from soviet companies. 
 
After 1991, despite the scale of the economic crisis, mass unemployment did not appear (CLARKE, 
1998). No doubt that this can be explained by persistent forms of under-employment, the lack of real 
restructuration of enterprises, and the will to avoid breaking off the former social compromise. 
 
This situation is accompanied by a persistent labour shortage. It is kept up by an important turnover of 
labour force in industry, because of numerous voluntary departures. They generate a high level of 
hiring, above all of skilled workers
4
.  
 
This suggest to link the persistent labour shortage during the transition process with the special 
socioprofessional composition of unemployment in Russia. In september 1993, 89,3 % of the 
vacancies job centres proposed were manual worker jobs
5
, whereas most job seekers were former 
employees or white – collar workers. This gap still existed nine years later. Thus, in october 2002, 70 
% of the vacancies the Moscow job centre offered were worker jobs, whereas 67 % of registered 
unemployed were specialists and employees. 
 
Consequently, we aim at giving an explanation to the keeping of an important and unsatisfied demand 
for manual labour force and, this way, to better grasp the socioprofessional characteristics of  
unemployment in Russia.  
 
1.2. THE LIMITS OF THE STANDARD APPROACH 
 
Applying the standard programme of privatization meant the disappearance of central planning and 
the cutting out of the centralized allowance of resources, especially the "salaries fund" assigned by the 
state to each company. This disappearance was supposed to favour the development of a genuine 
market of the work factor, allowing to determine the relative cost of the different working forces. The 
high cost of manual labour would lead to its decline, because of its poor efficiency and because of 
qualifications unsuited to the demand. 
 
The organization of the Russian enterprise has followed an other direction. Privatization in Russia has 
neither led to an estimation of the cost nor to a rationalization of material and human assets. 
 
There is still a strong preference for manual labour. The numerous subsidiary workshops prove useful 
in a context of price upsurge and barter. Central workers are kept in case the production might start 
again. Productivity investments are postponed. 
 
Then, the forms of privatization implied to strengthen the role of the groups of workers in the 
management of the firm, as these groups were willing to maintain payments and employment. Hence a 
                                                          
3
 Cf. KORNAI J. (1984): Economics of  Shortage, North Holland. 
4
 GUIMPELSON V. and LIPPOLDT D. point out the same fact in their case study (1997) : “Labour turnover in 
the russian economy”, in Labour Market Dynamics in the Russian Federation, OECD, Paris. 
5
 Source: derived from the Federal Job Centre of Russia. 
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very different ruling of the firm from that imagined by the standard approach in which the interests of 
shareholders would prevail over those of employees. 
 
What's more, the Russian industry knows a deepening of the previous economic order's pathologies 
(BURAWOY and KROTOW, 1992). Thus inter-enterprises barter has increased and the 
conglomerates and industrial complexes have strengthened their monopoly position. Monopolies have 
reinforced the production transfer to the groups of workers. The power of these groups is 
consequently closely associated with the global functioning of the transition process.  
 
All in all, the standard approach has underestimated the role of social relations present in the forms of 
organization of the firms which triggered the original context of unemployment in Russia. 
 
 
II INTERPRETING UNEMPLOYMENT IN TERMS OF SOCIETAL 
EFFECT    
 
2.1. PRIORITY GIVEN TO AN EDUCATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE 
FIRMS' NEEDS 
 
2.1.1. WORKERS' TRAINING : TWO SEPARATE GROUPS 
 
The soviet educational system was composed of a general secondary education course and a 
professional secondary education course. General secondary education had a hierarchy with a "basic" 
teaching (osnovnoïe) which ended up with the 8th class and a "complete" teaching  (polnoïe) until the 
10th class. 
 
Professional secondary education also had a hierarchy composed of specialized secondary schools 
(the SSOUZ
6
), generally bringing a higher qualification than professional highschools (the PTUs
7
, 
integrated to firms) and with a better social value. 
 
a. A weak relation between training and employment  
 
Let's recall one of the definitions of the “educational relation” given by the societal analysis : “they 
are relations between the hierarchy of the positions offered by the educational system and that of the 
different categories of employment”8 
 
The soviet system do associates training and employment. The ITR qualification can only be assigned 
to graduates from specialized secondary education (SSOUZ) or from higher education (VOUZ). 
 
In point of fact, companies often use the term of “specialist” instead of “ITR”. If this term is used to 
refer to holders of a technical or engineer degree, it applies by extension to every employee whose 
qualification, whether academic or from experience, is higher than the average. Some workers are 
called "specialists" and in that the status of ITRs seems barely protected. 
 
Moreover, the workers’ promotion on the companies’ internal labour market largely contributes to the 
access of the ITRs’group, as the personnel manager of the EMDPA explains: 
 
                                                          
6
 SSOUZ : Srednoïe Spetsialnoïe Ouchebnoïe Zavedenie : Specialized Secondary Schools 
7
 PTU : Professionalnoïe Tekhnicheskoïe Uchiliche : Professional Highschools 
8
 Cf. MAURICE M., SELLIER F., SILVESTRE J. – J. (1979): “La production de la hiérarchie dans l’entreprise: 
recherche d’un effet sociétal”, Revue Française de Sociologie, XX. 
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“For example, a salaried has five years’ service and has done well with his work; the certification 
commission can confer him the qualification of engineer, even with secondary specialized training” 
 
The “specialist” category is thus the product of a conception of qualification which characterizes the 
soviet production system. The term is first used to differenciate skilled or very skilled workers from 
basically qualified workers. Any qualification makes a specialist. 
 
b. Heterogenity of the manual workers group 
 
In the USSR, professional secondary education plays a part in the manual workers group's 
heterogeneity. Indeed, besides basic professional education leavers, part of the graduates from 
specialized secondary education hold workers' jobs. The opposition between these two sources 
producing working qualification dates back to the 1930s when under a logic of workers' promotion by 
the new régime, a sort of “working elite” was born, which all the more told it from the other manual 
labours (unskilled workers, etc...) and assigned to the skilled jobs generated by the rapid 
industrialization stage (BETTELHEIM, 1974 – 1983). 
 
A sort of coherence emerges between the presence of a training course, specialized secondary schools 
and the constitution of the most qualified and professionally mobile working group.  
 
2.1.2. THE TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE SOVIET EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM : RAISING 
OF THE SCHOOL-LEAVING AGE AND EXPANSION OF THE BASIC PROFESSIONAL 
BRANCH. 
 
a. Raising of the school-leaving age 
 
Between the sixties and the eighties, a raising of the school-leaving age can first be noticed. The 
course of study for fifteen-years-old school leavers deeply changed. While in 1965, more than 40% 
directly headed for a job, only 0.5% did in 1980
9
. This was due to the fact that more pupils were 
allowed to continue their studies and do the last two years of general education, and because of the 
expansion of PTUs. Consequently, there is a delay in entering the labour market. But it also means 
that little or unskilled jobs were more and more assigned to young people with a better level in 
general training. 
 
b. The decreasing place of higher education 
 
Another striking fact of the educational system is the constant decline of the part of each generation 
acceding to ITR level trainings. In 1965, more than 80% of 10th class leavers continued studies in 
higher educational establishments (VOUZ) or specialized secondary establishments (SSOUZ) (cf. 
chart1). In 1980, they were only 30%. The principal cause of it is the increase in the number of 
registrations from the 8th to the 9th class in general education, which increased competition to accede 
to higher education. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9
 Cf. MARNIE S. (1986) : “Transition from School to Work : Satisfying Pupils’ Aspirations and the Needs of the 
Economy”, in LANE D. (ed.) : Labour and Employment in the USSR, Brighton, Wheatsheaf Books Ltd. et 
DUNSTAN J. (1985) : Soviet Education Beyond 1984 : a Commentary on the Reform Guidelines, Compare, 
15:2, pp. 161-187. 
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Table 1 
             
Course of study of 10th class leavers from 1965 to 1980 (in percentages) 
 
 1965 1975 1980 
VOUZ 41,4 15,8 16,3 
SSOUZ 42,4 16,0 15,6 
PTU - 12,9 26,9 
Job 16,2 55,3 41,2 
 
Source: Marnie (1986), p. 212; DUNSTAN (1985), pp. 164 - 165 
 
c. Expansion of the PTU system 
 
On the other hand, the PTU system has known a great expansion. Apart from the course of study of 
8th class leavers to the 9th which reads like the continuation of the general education branch, in 1980, 
the PTUs constituted the first course of study ahead of the SSOUZ and the VOUZ (cf Table 1) 
 
Nonetheless, this expansion revealed insufficient for the planners. When launching the 1984 school 
reform, their target was to steer the leavers towards PTUs rather than towards the 9th class of general 
training. The reason for this change may have been the imbalance between the job categories 
available on the market – mostly workers jobs – and the training of new coming pupils. The lack of 
workforce could be an other reason : the early direction towards PTUs helped job offer increase. This 
reform was criticized and more or less abandoned in 1988. But on the verge of the fall of the system, 
the reasons which led to this reform – important demand of working labour and shortage of workforce 
– remain. 
 
2.1.3. A DEEP TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUPILS' COURSE OF STUDY AFTER 
1997/98 
 
The respective place of every important educational system course of study noticeably changed 
around 1997/98 when the last important crisis of the Russian economy occurred. (Table 2). The 
system of PTUs knew an important diminution of its graduate numbers (-21.5% between 1993/94 and 
2001/02) while specialized secondary education (SSOUZ) progressed a little and higher education 
knew the greatest increase among all the courses of study. 
 
Table 2 
 
Division of secondary and higher education graduates (in thousands) 
 
 
 93 / 94 97 / 98 01 / 02 
Graduates from professional higher education  445 458 720 
Graduates from SSOUZ 546 538 593 
Graduates from PTUs 922 800 759 
9th class leavers 1 878 2 073 2 265 
11th class leavers 987 1 159 1 473 
 
Source: Rossia v tsifrakh, kratkii statisticheskii sbornik (2002), Goskomstat Rossii, Moscow 
 
However, on the labour market, during the transition as before, the most qualified people are 
disadvantaged. 
 
Before the beginning of the transition, diplomas already didn’t protect from unemployment. An 
American survey highlighted a positive relation between the level of qualification and the level of 
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unemployment : though 0,7 % of the persons without any training after secondary education were 
unemployed, 0,9 % of the persons with a secondary professionnal training diploma and 1,5 % of those 
with higher education didn’t have a job10.  
 
The first years of transition confirm this apparently paradoxical relation between training and 
employment. According to SOLLOGOUB (1993), "unemployment is higher among the workers with 
a higher education than average". In January 1993, 55.8% of the jobless were graduates from higher 
education or from general secondary education. In the same way, a quantitative survey led between 
1991 and 1997 (GERBER, 2002) shows that the relation between diploma standard and employment 
is not systematically positive in Russia. Most of the highest qualifications are not shown to advantage 
in the Russian industry. 
 
 
This part showed that from the 60s to the 80s, the soviet educational system had steered towards an 
increase of professional education in relation with companies. This system maintained an intermediate 
technical course which produced a more qualified labour workforce than others. As to the access to 
higher education, it remained limited and was widely far from the industrial world. These 
characteristics, which still stood until the late 90s, finally met the companies' high demand for labour 
workforce, which internal labour market predominated over graduate qualification as regards the 
organization of professional mobilities. The new educational system trends in Russia, characterized 
by the growth of general secondary education and higher education question about the ancient 
structuring between training and employment as it was constructed in the soviet “educational 
relation”. 
 
The following part is to examine an additional dimension, the “organizational relation”, so as to go 
further into understanding the societal coherence which led to the characteristics of unemployment in 
Russia. 
 
2.2. AN ORGANIZATION IN PRODUCTION WHICH PRIORITIZES MANUAL 
LABOUR   
 
The “organizational relation” comprises the social relations related to production and its organization. 
The main characteristic of this relation in the soviet enterprise is the power of skilled workers groups 
because of the companies' preference for manual labour and the control of production. This power is 
consistent with the forms of organization in companies (shortages, old equipments). The priority of 
the employment policies led by the managements, as much before the fall of the system as after, is to 
maintain workers collectives. On the other hand, the ITRs' downward mobility, aggravated by a 
deterioration of payment and working conditions, illustrates the unfavourable position of these 
categories within the production social relations. 
 
2.2.1. MAINTAINING WORKERS COLLECTIVES 
 
a. An organization in production which favours manual labour 
 
In soviet type economies, work organization is characterized by a withdrawn attitude of the working 
collective. It is made clear by an internalization of the tasks rather than an externalization towards 
production units outside the company and by an optimization of internalized knowledge rather than a 
specialization based on specific trades. These behaviours, clearly opposed to the economical logic of 
western companies, are yet consistent with the economical unity to which they belong, for they 
constitute a response to the shortage risk peculiar to the socialist economy. The increase in repair or 
semi-finished goods annex workshops largely meets the difficulties generated by the supplying 
                                                          
10
 GREGORY P. R. et COLLIER I. L. (1988) : Unemployement in the Soviet Union : Evidence from the Soviet 
Interview Project, American Economic Review, 78 : 4, pp. 613 – 632. 
 8 
problems. In the seventies, the integration process entailed with the creation of “production 
amalgamations” and “industrial amalgamations” led to reinforce the trend to internalize the functions 
and to decrease specialization. 
 
These forms of organization of companies contribute to a strong preference for manual labour for 
several reasons. First, the work demand for the numerous annex workshops must be met, these 
workshops being not only assigned to the creation of capital goods, but also to the creation of 
consumer goods where the shortage risk prevails. Second, because the shortage of manual workers has 
the same role as the buffering of material means (solutions to the shortage of workers) and enables 
"mobilizing surges" when the production plan must be finished off (for instance, the "rushes" of the 
end of annual plan or “sturmovscina”), and more work resources are needed. Third, because of a 
phenomenon of work substitution for capital when the shortages appear in capital goods. Finally, 
companies “tend to maintain an important part of employment in manual labour on account of the 
vulnerability due to the irregular supplying of mechanized systems.” 11 
 
More widely, the preference for manual labour is rooted in the soviet system logic of extensive 
accumulation, as the planner is inclined to create work places. 
 
For SAPIR, priority given to manual labour is explained, besides technical and economical causes, by 
the “power structures inherited from the period of social ascent”12. The author reminds us that from 
1928 to the fifties, the soviet enterprise workshop was a “busy area”, and “for about twenty-five years 
(...) the workers' condition was marked with the perspective of social ascent”.  
 
This period of social ascent might have been auspicious to the increase in power of promoted people 
coming from the workers' group (the vydvyzency), these people having developed a conception of 
work and production control favourable to this group. The power of the vydvyzency would have been 
maintained within the organizations hierarchy until the 80s, which once again acounts for the support 
brought to manual labour. 
 
b. Division of authority in the workshop : brigades and worker control 
 
This favour given to manual labour can be found in the spreading of worker control exerted on 
production as well as on different workforce control variables. 
 
Observing the functioning of collective forms of work (brigades) constitutes an appropriate way to 
study the forms of autonomy and worker control. 
 
At first brigades exert a control over production organization. The hierarchy leaves an autonomy for 
the brigade leader to share out the tasks in accordance with the workers. Within the brigades, the 
teams and their members have a freedom to really control the steady flow and intensity of production. 
The demands about the work to do are essentially based on quantity and those about the available 
means to fulfil it are quite lax. This autonomy may solve the failures of the soviet economy. 
 
Brigades also exert their autonomy as far as the workers' salaries are concerned. Within each brigade 
can be distinguished influential or "leading" workers who manage the salaries fund and share it out 
among the members. Together with this payment method, a system – also decentralized – of 
assessment and stimulation exists, the work sharing ratio (KTU). It consists of a self-marking, 
according to which the workers make their own calculation and allot this ratio to one another. 
 
                                                          
11
 See SAPIR J. (1992) : Le rapport salarial soviétique au risque des lectures occidentales, séminaire : Le 
travail : marché et organisation, LERPSO – CNAM, Paris, novembre 1992, p. 3. 
12
 See SAPIR J. (1992) : Le rapport salarial… , p. 4. 
 
 9 
Brigades thus have an autonomy faced with the foremen and the workshop foremen. The role of these 
last two staff categories is less focused on controlling than on negociating with other workshops and 
with the management in order to meet some of the workers groups' demands as to production or 
payment organization. 
 
As for the term of “leading” workers, it brings to mention the existence of a hierarchical authority 
within the working class. These leaders both have a worker status, which means that they are 
committed into the direct production of goods, and a superior status, for the worker duty confers an 
authority on some dimensions of work and production organization. 
 
c. The worker control since the end of the soviet system : the example of workshops leasing. 
 
Leasing or renting (arenda) stems from a 1989 law. This text is part of a panel of reforms which 
progressively aim at changing legal basis as well as the types of exercise of economic activity. 
 
The study of the transition of some workshops to the status of leased company makes us observe a 
reinforcement of the workers collectives' power. It relies on a growing legal and organizational 
autonomy faced with the parent company brought by the new status. 
 
These autonomous forms of organization developed within the arenda inherit from the experience 
gained in the soviet enterprise and from brigade work. Most often, they benefit from the support of 
managements, because they permit to ensure production in a less certain environment more steered by 
demand. Furthermore, the arenda allows to preserve directly productive workforce, whereas 
administrative staff is considered unproductive and costly. 
 
The words of the personnel manager of the EMDPA clearly show these managing choices : “Our 
salaries are low (...) because of the maintain of managing administrative staff”.  
 
For a workshop collective, a way to lighten the financial weight of this staff and to favour worker jobs 
consists in creating a workshop leased to the parent company :  
 
“... to maintain the administrative authorities to a minimum, having higher profit and giving it back to 
the workers, the workshop's collective has decided, voted and signed an agreement to become a 
leasing company” (a foreman from a leased workshop)  
 
This attention paid to worker collectives by managers, while the ITR group turns out to be distinctly 
disadvantaged, seems in keeping with the continuation of the behaviours observed in the soviet 
enterprise. 
 
d. Worker control and breaking up of the economic system 
 
Beyond the internal functioning of enterprises, the worker collectives’ power seems closely linked 
with the global functioning of the transition process. As BURAWOY and KROTOV write it (1992, 
p.21) : “Worker control of production deepens as monopolies become stronger and supply shortages 
intensify”. For instance, the monopolies controlling resources become trade companies which transfer 
production to their worker collectives. 
 
For these authors, the ancient system still recurs and even knows a deepening of its pathologies. 
Inter-companies barter has grown and the conglomerates and amalgamations have reinforced their 
monopoly. 
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2.2.2. THE UNFAVOURABLE SITUATION OF ITRS 
 
We have just seen that the hierarchy of the qualifications in the soviet enterprise strengthened the 
position of the worker groups. Correlatively, it made the position of professionals little favourable. 
This preference for labour work can first be observed through a phenomenon which characterizes the 
soviet economy, the phenomenon of downward social mobility of ITRs. It comes with a deterioration 
of the terms of payment and the working conditions of this group during the decades which precedes 
the fall of the soviet system. 
 
a. The downward social mobility of ITRs : companies' practices... 
 
In the companies, two logics lead to the downward mobility of ITRs. First, the central managers of the 
economy are favourable to a reduction in the weight of “non-industrial” working categories, i.e., 
according to the soviet terminology, undirectly productive. Second, the labour shortage leads to 
favour internal professional mobility towards these employment categories. These logics tend to 
reinforce just before the fall of the system, because the economical and financial difficulties make 
companies accelerate the conversion of “non-productive” jobs into directly productive jobs.  
 
“... We have a situation in which leaders and specialists were numerous, and in the sphere of 
production, the workers were not in sufficient numbers. And we have met the problem consisting in 
proposing workers' positions to managing people. The redundancy of specialists took place in 
1990-91, and we offered them workers' jobs. And as the workers' jobs at the assembly shop are good, 
(...) a lot of them have accepted”. (The personnel manager of the EMDPA) 
 
b. ... and general data 
 
As a whole, the soviet economy was characterized by a significant proportion of specialists working 
as workers. This phenomenon is all the more important as it went growing with time. 
 
In 1985, 10.1 % of graduates from higher education and 42.2 % of those from specialized secondary 
education worked as workers. The proportion of workers among these graduates was noticeably lower 
ten years before (respectively 5.6 % and 32.1 % for each category). This difference between training 
and employment is more pronounced for the specialists with a technician level, for whom the worker 
status has become a very important part of the professional perspectives on the labour market. 
 
c. The low level of ITRs relative salaries, a factor of downward social mobility 
 
The study of the evolution of salaries in terms of major socioprofessional categories shows that the 
soviet planner has tried to narrow the gap between wages between professional categories, this has 
favoured worker groups and disadvantaged the ITR category (table 3). Thus, the ITRs relative salary  
plummeted from the 60s to the 80s. 
Table 3 
 
Average wage in the industrial sector by job categories expressed in comparison with the  
average wage in state sector employment, 1965 - 1985 
 
 workers ITRs 
1965 1,05 1,54 
1970 1,07 1,46 
1975 1,10 1,37 
1980 1,10 1,26 
1985 1,11 1,23 
1965 – 1985 + 6 % - 20 % 
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Source : GOSKOMSTAT 
 
For the companies, lowering ITRs wage is a means of limiting their “wage fund” rather than the 
workers'. This practice can still be found after 1991 in the companies surveyed, which try to reduce 
the volume of ITR staff so that skilled workers will keep an attractive wage level. 
 
The low level of ITRs salaries finally brings an additional explanation to their downward social 
mobility. A broad study led in the 80s had shown that a great majority of graduates employed as 
workers had refused the jobs of ITRs they had been offered. These graduates reproached ITR jobs 
with a too low wage, and with a too important workload for the salary given. 
 
d.  The labour market segmentation approach 
 
The segmentation theory gives a general interpretation of the disadvantaged place holded by the ITRs 
on the labour market  
 
The soviet labour market comprises a primary and a secondary segment (MALLE, 1986). Secondary 
labour markets are based on less interesting compensation systems. They display unfavourable 
characteristics for the skilled workforce : limited promotion prospects, the use of obsolete 
technologies and a limited interest for high technological knowledge, the lack of trust in the most 
qualified people suspected of instability. 
 
Consequently, the most qualified workers preferably move toward primary labour markets which tend 
to reach saturation with regard to some skills and professional fields. According to MALLE, the 
existence of many qualified and badly paid white collar workers, with uncertain  promotion prospects 
proved the crisis of upward social mobility, on more and more saturated primary labour markets. 
Managers, on primary segments, can use their power on the staff in order to be more selective in 
hiring new employees, and forcing them to do jobs which level is under their qualification.  
 
e. The situation of ITRs becomes more serious after 1991 
 
The transition process didn’t radically change the work process in enterprises. The demand for the 
most qualified workforces didn’t increase. On the contrary, in the firms we have surveyed, the 
workers / ITRs ratio increased. A survey ILO carried out in 1995 finds the same : total industrial 
employment was mainly composed of manual workers (four employees out of five), the share of 
unskilled manual work even continued to increase in 1994 - 1995. As for hiring, it mostly regarded 
manual workers. 
 
We have studied the “organizational relation” of the Russian enterprise through the opposition 
between workers and non-workers. What came out was that the companies' organization forms, 
associated with political leaders' macrosocial choices have led to a preference for working labour 
force. The “organizational space” as structured in relation with the planner's orientation thus led to 
social relations in which the working-class group has an advantage over the ITR group, as this space 
greatly keeps on structuring the Russian companies' management forms after 1991. 
 
We are now going to analyse the “industrial relation” as the third direction allowing to explain the 
coherence and the “societal effects” to which we are trying to give prominence. 
 
2.3. WORKERS' NEGOCIATING POWER DURING AND AFTER THE SOVIET 
SYSTEM 
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The “industrial relation” studies the social relations established around payments and the control of 
demands. We shall also study these relations when they are associated with employment, new stake in 
the period of transition. 
 
2.3.1.THE MAINTAIN OF HIGH FRINGE BENEFITS AFTER 1991 
 
The payment system used in the soviet enterprise offered relatively high fringe benefits compared 
with wages.  
 
The objective of this system was to pay central workers better and to settle them down, knowing that 
the monetary forms of income offered but a limited access to some goods and services, and played a 
restrained stimulating role. 
 
The important place taken by these fringe benefits thus appears linked with that acquired historically 
by some categories of manual workers – especially in priority sectors – as far as social relations in 
production are concerned.   
 
After 1991, the proportion of fringe benefits remains strong in companies. This reality is not in 
accordance with the standard transition plan which expected a growing monetarization of economical 
relations and more particularly of the relations between employees and employers. It is inherited from 
the structure of the soviet payment system (SPITZ and VINOKUROVA, 1994, p.1). The high 
proportion of fringe benefits turns out to be coherent with the will of companies' managements to 
maintain the position of central workers collectives within the production system. 
 
2.3.2. THE FIGHT TO MAINTAIN EMPLOYMENT : WINNERS AND LOSERS 
 
The staff cuts threats hanging over little before the transition become more precise with the 1991 
redundancy laws. Yet, in the surveyed companies, there had been few redundancies. There was a 
multiplication of the forms of under-employment, and part of the staff cuts was hidden under the term 
of voluntary departure. Finally, some worker groups keep the ability to quit voluntarily the company, 
or to threaten to do so. 
 
a. At first, managements limit redundancies and keep employees in the company without their having 
to work. They are essentially low-skilled workers and/or touched by a decrease in production. These 
latter agree to have “unpaid leaves” because they keep an employment legal bond which allows them 
to preserve the social advantages related to it. For instance, in a EMDPA assembly shop with 150 
employees (principally low or in-between qualified women) only fifty or so employees still had a 
full-time job. 
 
“ The others (the 100 left), are only on paper... It is hidden unemployment. Officially, the worker is on 
the list, he hasn't been made redundant, but he is told : you can't come, write down on the attendance 
sheet "unpaid leave", we don't need you at  the moment” (a workshop foreman). 
 
Nevertheless, this under-employment can be considered as a form of labour hoarding, which 
managements justify with a possible production recovery. 
 
b. Moreover, at the workshop's level, brigades' members have an autonomous decision-making power 
on the departures. This self-selection also illustrates how the group's pressure may turn redundancies 
into voluntary departures. 
 
"Redundancies? A very painful thing. Here, everything is inspected, you take your notebook and you 
say : 'My friends, I have a redundancy job to do (ordered by the management) and five workers have 
to go'. And you start looking at everything : 'And you, how is it going at home? You may leave on 
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your own accord, or initiative? Just write a voluntary redundancy demand to me...'. If theanswer is 
no, then you tell her the truth without batting an eyelid : 'Your work is not consciencious enough (...), 
I don't want you” (a brigade leader to her workers). 
 
c. With an autonomous functioning status (arenda) within the combinates, some skilled worker 
groups manage to negociate conditions to maintain their job. Yet this strategy points up the 
employees' unequal capacity to defend their job, some of them being deeply weakened by the new 
management and market conditions. 
 
2.3.3. HOW TO DEAL WITH DEMANDS 
 
“work collectives” are a representative entity of the employees. A collective is composed of the whole 
staff of a company including the management. 
 
From the mid 70s, the soviet leaders seem to have wished for more active employees' holdings. The 
1977 soviet Constitution (8th Article) thus comprises an article about the “working collectives”, 
which specifies their participation to debates and decisions at the firm level as well as the state level. 
Despite this text, during the soviet era, the role of working collectives remains quite feeble as far as 
the representation of the staff interests are concerned. 
 
After 1991, in many companies, working collectives acquire more importance.  They appear as the 
the only organized power with a plain worker identification. Opposite, we notice the void provoked 
by the end of the Party as a governing body on the workplace, as well as the suspicion of workers 
about the “official” trade unions re-created as alternative trade unions. 
 
Furthermore, the new shapes of big industrial companies (autonomous workshops) lead to a bigger 
decentralization of stakes and negociations. The relevant level to grasp negociation is that of the 
workshop and not only that of the whole company. 
  
b. Privatization :  sharing the power with central workers groups 
 
The Russian privatization is a source of power for some workers groups
13
. It gives them the possibility 
to delay the strategic restructurings of the companies and to preserve employment. It facilitates the 
setting aside of the professional groups which could apply control techniques on the labour force and 
of white-collar workers who would spread their controlling and leading functions over production. 
 
 
III - INTEREST OF THE SOCIETAL APPROACH AND LESSONS SO 
AS TO READ THE POST-SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION 
 
3.1. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE REASONING AND OF THE 
TOOLS USED BY THE SOCIETAL APPROACH 
 
3.1.1. METHODOLOGICAL PREMISES : STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
 
a. Appropriate premises : inductive approach and endogenous aspect of the analysis categories   
 
The first interest of the societal approach lays on its inductive process. It draws lessons from the 
observation of real experiences to deduce general ideas. These latter differ from the classical notion 
                                                          
13
 See the results of the study by TURUNEN J. (2004) : “ Leaving state sector employment in Russia ”, in 
Economics of Transition, vol. 12 (1) pp. 129 – 152. 
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of generalization which prevails in the standard scientific reasoning associated with the deductive 
logic, such as economical modelization applied to the transition of postsocialist economies. 
 
This approach is also relevant because it socializes the categories it examines. Thus, the 
“unemployment” category in Russia must be related to the social conditions of its production. It is the 
expression of specific modes of managing and organising the division of labour and social relations. It 
loses the paradoxical aspect lent by the classical economical analysis. On the contrary, it acquires a 
contextual social rationality where the standard approach promotes a determinist view of the 
transition. 
 
b. A difficult integration of  dynamics and a minimization of the external variables 
 
Even though some authors have introduced dynamics in the societal analysis
14
 , priority given to the 
endogenisation of the explanation can be reproachful. This explanation tends to favour “self – 
maintenance” – thus reproduction – processes and makes it difficult to understand changing 
phenomena. It may lower the reach of some change logics at work in postsocialist economies. 
 
Moreover, putting internal coherence (national) forward reduces the role of external variables 
(internationalization). When prioritizing internal coherence explanation, the societal approach does 
not necessarily ask questions about the limits of the system taken into account. Yet, the tightening of 
Russia's external constraints and the direct foreign investments probably play a part in the dimensions 
of our study subject. 
 
3.1.2. STRENGTH OF THE SOCIETAL SALES PITCH 
 
The first property of this approach is to make apparently paradoxical facts understandable, because it 
shows their interdependecy and their coherence with a wider social set. Consequently, it proves the 
existence of a relative rationality, instead of referring to the logic of absolute rationality of the 
standard approach. 
 
Its strength also comes from its ability to understand the relations between enterprise and society, 
actors and spaces, and so between micro and macroeconomical or macrosocial facts. Indeed, the 
phenomena observed within the company (management, division of labour, social relations) have only 
sense in their relation with wider social constructions. Hence, two methodological additions of this 
approach to analyse the transition : it allows to learn lessons from local research teachings ; it is based 
on a several levels analysis (micro, meso, macro). 
 
The societal approach allows to deal with the specific and historical question within social 
phenomena, and so considers understanding the transition as a non-determinist process. 
 
To draw out this theme about the specificity of social facts, we shall get close to a relativist 
conception of qualification as defined by Pierre NAVILLE
15
. According to him, qualification is a 
“social estimation of the relative working value”. So, fundamentally, if a society confers a strong 
value on the activity of a worker with a high training level and with hierarchical responsibilities, this 
high value is but the result of the value given by that society and at one point to that work. NAVILLE 
stands up for the idea of a relativity in the value of work, and for the relative value of a specific work 
compared with an other one. This idea allows to understand that in the soviet – then postsoviet – 
economy, a very different hierarchy of qualifications from that existing in market capitalist economies 
can exist. 
 
                                                          
14
 See the contributions of the authors to the book “Embedding organizations. Societal Analysis…” 
15
 Cf. Essai sur la qualification du travail, Paris, Marcel Rivière, 1956. 
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Finally, the societal approach helps seize the relations between statics and dynamics. The social 
constructs and the processes which produce them, being historical, thus incidental, both have a 
capacity of “self – maintenance” and “non – identical reproduction”. 
 
3.2. THE LESSONS FROM POST-SOCIALIST CHANGE 
 
3.2.1. THE SOCIETAL APPROACH ENLIGHTENS THE QUESTION OF REPRODUCTION 
OF PAST SOCIAL FACTS  
 
The labour market illustrates the question of reproduction : persistent labour shortages, maintaining 
working autonomy forms, difficulty to retrain and rejection of ITRs categories can be observed ... For 
the societal approach, these facts are not imbalances compared with a transition of the market alleged 
“normal”. They lead to draw the hypothesis of the existence of the structural realities which bear 
them. These realities are called “spaces” by the societal approach. These spaces are structured sets but 
they also structure the social reality : therefore they contribute to the reproduction of societal sets. But 
it is not an identical reproduction, because the spaces are influenced by the effects of the social actors' 
dynamics. 
 
Apart from the structuring characteristic of the spaces, the societal approach lays the emphasis on 
their mutual coherence, which is also a factor of reproduction of the social facts. 
 
What's more, the idea of reproduction allows to make the forms of privatization of the Russian 
companies more understandable, these companies being dominated by insiders, in particular by the 
salaried. It indeed stressed the central position of the worker actor in the social relations around the 
companies organization. And the interdependency between these different social relations 
(organization, training, payment system) reinforces the position of this actor within the forms of 
enterprise governing in Russia. 
 
3.2.2. THE SOCIETAL ANALYSIS ALSO HELPS THINK ABOUT THE DYNAMICS OF 
SPACES, AND, BEYOND, OF SYSTEMS 
 
a. From the dynamics of spaces ... 
 
If the societal analysis insists on coherences, it also deals with their dynamics. Yet, these dynamics 
notably comes from the tensions between the spaces studied. As MAURICE (1999) underlines it, 
interdependencies “may as equally well be an expression of cooperation as of competition, of 
consensus as of opposition, of tension or of conflict” 16. 
 
The interdependencies observed before the transition presented tensions. For instance, the 
“qualificational space” knew an increasing tension between the planner's objectives, focused on the 
will to answer the demand for blue – collar workforce and to reduce the labour shortage, and the 
social choices expressed by the population for an extension of secondary education and higher level 
trainings. This tension can read as a phenomenon which contributes to a dynamics of spaces, going as 
far as to the transition process. 
 
J.-J. SILVESTRE's typology 
22
 (mechanical, organical, structural), about the dynamics of 
“qualificational space” enlightens us about employment transformations in Russia. In this country, the 
principal mode to react to the changes boosted by the transition was of “organical” type. It means that 
the post – soviet “societal grouping” reaction consisted in appealing to already installed fundamental 
functioning principles. Thus, social relations remained favourable to “central” workers' interests in 
terms of income and employment. The firms often supported new forms of decentralized management 
                                                          
16
 See “Embedding organizations. Societal Analysis…”, p. 18 
 16 
which enabled to renew these workers' autonomy. On the other hand, the strong increase in higher 
education is a “mechanical” type of the educational relation transformation, because it is unfamiliar to 
the depth of the ancient “societal patterns of coherence”, which associated a predominant secondary 
professional teaching and production system centered on the use of semi-qualified workforce. 
 
b. ... to that of systems 
 
Furthermore, the resort to the notion of “societal effect” to explain the specificity of Russian 
unemployment leads to wonder about the origin and the ultimate nature of the facts accounting for 
this reality. What comes under a societal effect, and what comes under the system ? 
 
According to FRIEDBERG
17
, societal analysis is a kind of systemic analysis because it studies actor 
systems. This analysis is interested in the the social construction of partial institutionnal arrangements 
at different levels of society. And it is interested in “ the systems effects of these partial institutional 
arrangements, that is to say their endogenous dynamic and retroactive feedback loops which may 
account for their unidentical reproduction ”18. The “societal effects” thus can be considered as an 
other kind of system effect, this system being non-universal. 
 
Another idea, that of social phenomena (enterprises, actors) embedded
19
 in the society they develop 
in, comes under the hypothesis of a system effect. 
 
Nonetheless, when opposed to the theory of convergence, the societal analysis stands back from the 
dynamics of systems theory. Because it first relies on internal coherence and the endogenous aspect of 
the explanation, it shows the strictly specific character of “societal groupings” put forward and the 
logical impossibility to suppose a merging of several of these groupings in a systemic totality. The 
social facts contingency, their historicity, the role held by the social actors in the dynamics of spaces – 
thus the specificity of their action – are directed to the same way. 
 
Let us remind that the neo-classical doctrine of the transition could be but a “new form of the theory 
of convergence of the systems”20. In accordance with this doctrine, the final balance situation, known 
beforehand, was market economy, and strictly determined the shorter way from the starting point 
represented by the socialist economy. The reasoning mode of the societal approach is unfamiliar to 
this doctrine's vision. 
 
In the end, if we had to define a general system, to a certain extent “a societal system without 
boundaries” (MAURICE, 1999, p. 32), we would start all over again from the hypothesis of a “system 
of actors and spaces (both structured and structuring), forming supra national entities that contribute 
to the interdependance of  societal “groupings”. 
 
                                                          
17
 Cf. FRIEDBERG E. (1999) : “ Societal or systems effects ? ”, in MAURICE M., SORGE A., : Embedding 
organizations. Societal Analysis of Actors, Organizations and Socio-Economic Context, John Benjamins, 
Amsterdam, Philadelphie. 
18
 Idem, p. 70. 
19
 The idea that social facts were embedded in economy has been developed by POLANYI K. (1983) : La 
grande transformation, Gallimard, Paris. 
20
 Cf. CHAVANCE B. (2003) : “ Les théories économiques à l’épreuve de la transformation post-socialiste ”, 
Document de travail, CEMI – EHESS, Paris. 
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